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1. Introduction
There has been a growing concern about the impact of economic
policies on agriculture, especially among developing countries.
This is primarily because these policies - including agricultural
pricing policies, trade policies and macroeconomic policies -
directly and indirectly affect the domestic terms of trade
between agriculture and the rest of the economy [Krueger et al.
(1988)] and therefore the composition of agricultural output, the
adoption of new technology and the migration of labour from farms
to urban areas.
It is with this in mind that the Kiel Institute of World Econo-
mics has embarked on a Research Project to evaluate how policies
in developing countries affect their agricultural sectors.
Zimbabwe has been selected to represent one of three developing
countries which are to be analyzed in greater detail.
Zimbabwe is an interesting case since its agricultural sector
performs better than in most other Sub-Saharan African countries.
Zimbabwe is one of the few countries in Africa which have regu-
larly produced food surpluses and realized substantial agricul-
tural exports. It seems that government policy after independence
has been rather favourable for agriculture and, hence, Zimbabwe
is often seen as a model for agricultural policy in other African
countries. Another aspect of farm policy in Zimbabwe might have
positively influenced the performance of the agricultural sector:
After independence, a "Growth-with-Equity" strategy was promoted
for agriculture. Agricultural research, extension and credits
were redirected from the large-scale commercial subsector towards
the small-scale communal areas where the subsistence-oriented
agricultural sector has been traditionally located.
This paper presents parts of the findings of the Subproject on
"Structure and Development of Incentives for Agriculture in
Zimbabwe". The main objectives of this paper are:- 2 -
(a) to identify tax and subsidy transfers between the agricul-
tural sector and the rest of the economy, with particular
reference to:
- direct commodity taxes;
- direct subsidies and grants;
- implicit taxes and subsidies arising from administered
prices, import and export controls and the policies of
marketing boards and statutory agencies;
- indirect taxes, duties and subsidies operating on inputs
and other costs of production;
(b) to assess the impact of the taxes and subsidies in terms of
incentives and disincentives on a number of major agricul-
tural commodities produced in Zimbabwe; and
(c) to assess the magnitude, structure and trends in these
incentives and disincentives.
The study contains four chapters. Chapter two provides an
overview on the Zimbabwean economy with emphasis on the role of
agriculture. Chapter three presents the results on output and
input pricing policies. In chapter four other measures to support
agriculture are described. Finally, chapter five outlines the
summary and conclusions drawn from this study.
2. The Economy of Zimbabwe
2.1 Recent Economic Trends
When Zimbabwe achieved independence in April 1980, the country
had a diversified economy not only by African standards, with
a well-developed physical and administrative infrastructure. The
diversification of the economy ironically was attributable in
large part to the civil war, since the economic isolation imposed
during the period of sanctions necessitated the production of a
wide range of agricultural and manufactured products for the
domestic market. At the same time, even with sanctions, the- 3 -
country was able to continue to export agricultural and mining
products. Despite the relative soundness of the Zimbabwean eco-
nomy at independence, the new government faced a number of
difficult challenges. Leading priorities in the development
agenda included the rehabilitation of a severely depleted capital
stock, the restructuring of a strongly dualized economy, and the
redressing of glaring inequalities between racial groups in
income, ownership of land and capital and access to basic social
services such as health care and education. The "Growth-with-
Equity" program introduced at independence achieved important
early successes in helping the country to recover from the war.
During 1980 and 1981, the economy experienced a rapid burst of
growth in response to expansionary monetary and fiscal policies,
the lifting of sanctions, increases in global prices of
Zimbabwe's major agricultural and mining exports, and accelerated
foreign borrowing. After five years of negative or zero growth,
real GDP increased dramatically in 1980 and 1981 [see Table 1].
The ambitious goals of the "Growth-with-Equity" program were
tempered by the realization among policymakers that the dualized
nature of the economy could not be eliminated overnight without
hurting the country's agricultural and industrial base. There-
fore, the government moved swiftly to redress a number of obvious
inequities (for example, by providing increased job training to
blacks and by initiating land redistribution schemes designed to
place more land in the hands of communal farmers). But at the
same time, it was careful to protect the mining, manufacturing,
and commercial agricultural sectors that comprised the backbone
of the economy. Agricultural producer prices were raised to
stimulate increased output by commercial farmers, and resources
were invested in the road and rail systems to repair damage
sustained during the war. In 1982, the fortunes of the Zimbabwean
economy reversed dramatically as a result of a combination of
adverse external and internal factors. The global recession re-
duced the demand for Zimbabwe's exports, depressing foreign
exchange earnings and increasing the balance-of-payments deficit.
Expected capital inflows from overseas failed to materialize, and- 4 -


































































































































Source: Central Statistics Office (various issues); IMF (various issues).- 5 -
the deficit had to be financed through high-cost commercial
borrowing and drawdowns in foreign reserves. Meanwhile a severe
drought cut into the country's ability to export agricultural
commodities and necessitated imports of staple foodstuffs.
Finally, increased wages, rapid expansion of government spending,
and increased domestic credit fueled a burst of inflation. As a
result of these convergent forces, real GDP growth slowed
dramatically [Table 2].
Table 2: Annual Growth Rates, 1965-88



































During the mid-1980s, the performance of the economy was mixed.
Although significant progress was achieved in expanding education
and health services to the majority of the population, in raising
wage levels, and in redistributing land, many macroeconomic per-
formance indicators continued to give rise to concern among
policymakers. In spite of the fact that the current account
deficit was decreased, strict foreign exchange controls re-
stricted imports and added increased impetus to domestic in-
flation. Rising wage levels reduced the competitiveness of
Zimbabwe's traditional exports, which coupled with the continuing
stagnation of global commodities and mineral markets depressed
exports.- 6 -
2.2 Economic Structure
Zimbabwe is unique in the African region for the size and diver-
sity of its manufacturing sector. Equally important, however, is
the fact that this is accompanied by strong agriculture and min-
ing sectors. The result is that Zimbabwe is a lower-middle income
country whose GNP per capita, at US$ 650, is well above the
average for Sub-Saharan Africa.
As the latest World Bank's Development Report [World Bank (1990)
shows, Zimbabwe is equally strong in other indicators of general
socio-economic development, with life expectancy higher and in-
fant mortality lower than for the other countries in the region.
Population growth is very rapid. At an annual average growth rate
of 2.7 percent during 1980-1988 it is one of the highest in the
world (although the rate is expected to fall), and such a rate
of increase places heavy demand on the economic system. The
population is still predominantly rural-based, with only 27 per-
cent living in the towns and cities. However, this share is
increasing steadily; the urban population growth rate was 6.2
percent per annum for the period 1980 to 1988.
Table 3 shows the breakdown of GDP into the value-added arising
in each of the main sectors distinguished in national accounts.
It can be seen, that the structure of GDP is a remarkable one.
The share of manufacturing in the GDP (1988) is no less than 26.5
percent (at current prices), which is about three times the
average for Sub-Saharan. Africa. As the Table shows this share has
risen since 1975 from an already high value of 23.5 percent. The
increase has been mainly at the expense of agriculture and min-
ing, whose decline has also been accompanied by an expansion of
the share of the service sector.
Measured in constant prices, the changes have not been so great.
Indeed, as Table 4 shows, the share of manufacturing in GDP,
measured in 1980 prices, reached a peak of 24.9 percent in 1980
but declined thereafter to 24.4 percent in 1988.Table 3: Distribution of GDP by Sector of Origin, 1975-88 (percentage shares


























































Source: Calculated from Central Statistics Office (various issues).
Agriculture remains a strong sector characterized by two compo-
nents: commercial agriculture and the communal lands [see Section
2.3]. As can be seen, the contribution of mining to the overall
economy is the next most important, ranging from 7.2 percent in
1988 to 8.8 percent in 1980. The sector has been depressed for
some years, and output has shown little growth since its share
peak in 1980, until the recent upturn in the economy as a whole
which began in 1984. But it remains a strong sector. Both mining
and agriculture have important linkages to manufacturing. The
figures, therefore, show a significant difference from typical
trends in developing countries: the manufacturing sector already
has a share in the economy as a whole that is higher than that
found in some developed countries.- 8 -
Table 4: Distribution of GDP by Sector of Origin, 1975-88 (percentage shares


























































Source: Calculated from Central Statistics Office (various issues) .
Turning to the demand side of the economy, the figures in Table 5
show the shares of the main components of final demand in GDP.
Notable are the development of the shares of gross fixed capital
formation and government consumption. While at a reasonable level
in 1975, the share of gross fixed capital formation declined
steadily until 1979. A recovery took place with the country's
independence, but the increasingly difficult economic conditions
and a widening trade gap forced a decline in 1983. In fact, the
level of investment in 1983 in constant (1980) prices was US$ 649
million, hardly more than two-thirds the value in 1975.- 9 -
The figures in Table 5 show the change over time in the role of
foreign trade. Both the exports and imports of goods and services
have declined as a share of GDP in the first half of the 1980s.
At first sight this suggests that Zimbabwe was a less open eco-
nomy in 1983 than it was in 1975. In fact, however, the opposite
is true. In 1975 the UDI regime was subject to international
sanctions and boycotts, with trade being thus constrained, to
some degree at least, by the need to deal through intermediaries.
Since 1984 both the share of exports and imports of GDP have
increased substantially. *•
Table 5: Distribution of GDP by Sector of Destination, 1975-88 (percentage
shares based on current prices)
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Private
Consumption 62.1 67.7 67.0 65.0 68.8 59.2 55.5 54.5 49.1
Government
Consumption 12.8 19.7 17.2 19.8 18.4 21.3 22.2 21.8 27.6
Gross Fixed
Capital
Formation 23.4 15.3 18.7 20.0 19.6 18.5 16.1 15.9 15.5
Changes in
Stocks 2.9 0.3 4.4 1.2 -3.7 0.4 4.9 3.6 3.6
Exports in
Goods and
Services 29.5 30.3 25.2 22.0 21.3 26.7 29.9 30.9 32.1
Imports of
Goods and
Services -30.7 -33.3 -32.5 -27.9 -24.5 -18.5 -28.7 -26.6 -27.1
Source: Calculated from Central Statistics Office (various issues) .- 10 -
While exports and imports have declined from 29.5 percent and
30.7 percent of GDP in 1975 to 21.3 percent and 24.5 percent in
1983, this has been mirrored by increases in both public and
private consumption shares. Since independence, the economic
focus has been directed towards improving the quality of life of
the broad mass of the population. Private consumption did not
rise at all in real terms between 1975 and 1979, and then has
risen by 9 percent until 1983. However, in 1988 total real
private consumption reached the level of 1977.
2
2.3 The Agricultural Secto'r
Even though the Zimbabwean economy is well-diversified, with the
agricultural sector contributing less than one-fifth of total
GDP, the strategic contribution of agriculture should not be
underestimated. It contributes 40 percent to foreign exchange
earnings, 35 percent to formal employment and 36 percent to in-
dustrial raw materials. Furthermore, 75 percent of the population
derive their livelihood directly from farming. Maize is the main
food crop; commercial crops include coffee, tobacco, tea, sugar,
cotton, soyabeans, groundnuts and wheat. Total production of the
principal crops since 1965 is shown in Table 6.
The Zimbabwean agricultural sector is extremely dualistic. There
are essentially two sectors: the modern, technologically advanced
sector, comprising about 4,200 large-scale commercial farmers
plus labourers and their families totalling about 1.7 million
people, which accounts for about 12.8 million hectares or
approximately 39 percent of the available agricultural land in
the country; and the traditional smallholders' sector or communal
areas, comprising over 800,000 small-scale farm families total-
ling some 4 million people, which accounts for about 16.4 million
hectares or just about half of the available agricultural land.
The small-scale commercial areas and the relatively new resettle-
ment areas account for the remaining relatively small shares of
1.4 million hectares and 2.6 million hectares, respectively. The
communal areas have high population densities and are situated in- 11 -


















































































































































































































Source: Central Statistics Office (various issues);
Authority (various issues) and Morris (1988).
Agricultural Marketing- 12 -
less favourable lands. Less than 10 percent of the communal areas
fall in the relatively high rainfall zones of Natural Regions I
and II, while the corresponding proportion of the commercial
areas is about 30 percent. Also irrigation development is far
less in the communal areas than in the commercial areas (Table
7). The tackling of these inequalities, while maintaining overall
agricultural growth, is one of the major challenges facing Zim-
babwe .
Throughout the period 1976-1986 there was a continuing signifi-
cant emigration of commercial farmers from Zimbabwe. Given the
dual nature of the agricultural sector, the decline in the number
of large-scale commercial farmers and the decline in the acreage
under crops in the large-scale sector can be expected to have
affected the mix of agricultural output. The manufacturing sec-
tor, which absorbs a significant share of agricultural output as
its own inputs, has thus also been affected. Agricultural employ-
ment has decreased partly because of this decline in acreage
under crops, and the volume of agricultural exports (particularly
beef) is lower than might have been expected.
Income data indicate that the number of large-scale commercial
farmers, the majority of whom are white, declined from 6,370 in
1976 to about 4,200 by March 1988. About 1,000 farmers left the
sector between 1976 and 1980 during the peak of the civil war,
and an equal number departed after 1980. The area under crops in
the large-scale sector in 1988 was 20 percent below the level in
1975.
The distribution of agricultural output is such that most of it
originates from the commercial sector. The data for 1986 indicate
that 82 percent of the value of total output was from the commer-
cial sector which includes the small-scale and large-scale commer-
cial farmers. When specific crops are considered, the large-scale
commercial sector dominates the production of wheat (86 percent
of output in 1985), flue-cured tobacco (98 percent), beef (97.5




Table 7: Land Classification, Main Agricultural Uses, and Distribution of
Agricultural Land
Natural Area Rainfall Main Agricultural Uses Distribution of Agri-
Region cultural Land (percent)
Commercial Communal
Farming Areas
I 7,034 900-1200 Production of fruit, tea, 3 1
coffee; intensive live-
stock production
II 58,614 750-1000 Production of fieldcrops; 27 8
intensive livestock
production
III 72,877 650-800 Production of fodder 22 17
crops, cash crops, live-
stock; marginal produc-
tion of maize, tobacco,
cotton
IV 147,823 450-650 Production of drought- 26 45
resistent crops; live-
stock production
V 104,411 < 450 Extensive livestock 22 29
production; game
ranching
Source: World Bank (1985) and Morris (1988).- 14 -
products in addition to producing about half of the maize and
cotton crops. Agricultural exports comprised 51 percent of the
value of total exports in 1985. The most important agricultural
exports were flue-cured tobacco, cotton and cotton lint, beef,
tea and horticultural products.
Data since 1976 indicate that the long-term levels of output and
exports of these commodities is a function of the amount of land
under crops, but also producer prices play a significant role.
Commercial farmers are very sensitive to profitability con-
siderations, and this has implications for policy. Since many of
the major commercial crops are close substitutes in production,
commercial farmers are able to shift from one crop to another,
with the result that official producer price policies tend to be
very influential in shaping the production pattern. Indeed,
recent experience suggests that relatively minor adjustments to
the structure of producer prices have been highly effective in
bringing about extensive changes in cropping patterns on large-
scale commercial farms. This feature of the commercial farming
sector makes it especially important that Zimbabwean policymakers
"get prices right" in establishing agricultural production
priorities.
The importance of large-scale commercial farming in Zimbabwe,
apart from the larger share in output, also stems from the fact
that there are lower seasonal variations in output in times of
drought, compared with the small-scale sector. This is an
important consideration for national food security and export
earnings. Moreover, the large-scale sector, by virtue of its
information base and technological superiority, has been able to
respond much more rapidly to external market opportunities by
switching from low value to high value crops. The growth of the
coffee and horticultural exports and the development of game
farming by these are indications of this adaptability.- 15 -
This, however, does not mean to underplay the importance of the
small-farm sector which seems to have a relative comparative
advantage in the production of cotton, sunflower seed, poultry
and other dryland crops. Despite resource constraints the sector
has been highly responsive to policy incentives like producer
prices, extension, credit and access to marketing facilities. The
share of total maize production accounted for by the communal
areas has risen from 6 percent in 1980 to approximately 60 per-
cent in 1988/89, when total deliveries to the Grain Marketing
Board (GMB) amounted to 1.1 million tonnes. The cotton subsector
has also been marked by a rapid growth during the past eight
years, with total production of seed cotton rising from about
173,000 tonnes in 1980 to over 300,000 tonnes in 1988; and by a
major shift from production by large-scale commercial farmers to
smallholders, with the share of the latter increasing from 7
percent in 1980 to 53 percent in 1987.
The rate of growth in Zimbabwe is very much dependent on the
agricultural sector. The growth of GDP is strongly correlated
with that of agriculture and the level of capital imports which
in turn are financed partly by agricultural export earnings.
There are a number of reasons which explain this correlation
between agriculture and economic growth. First, business optimism
has been shown to be strongly associated with increases in agri-
cultural production [World Bank (1987)]. Second, a large share of
manufacturing activity involves the downstream processing of
agricultural commodities. Most prominent are the textile and food
processing industries (including the production of edible oils,
stockfeeds, beef and grain milling), ethanol production and
tobacco processing. About 44.3 percent of the total output of the
manufacturing sector originates from agriculture related in-
dustries. Third, the high share of agricultural commodities in
exports makes them an important factor in the short-term devel-
opment prospects for the economy given the dependence on imports
of capital goods.- 16 -
3. Agricultural Price Incentives
The aim of this capter is to measure the extent of government
intervention in agriculture . Agricultural pricing policies are
considered by means of the Nominal Rates of Protection (Sub-
section 3.1) and the Effective Rates of Protection (Subsection
3.2) for several major agricultural commodities of Zimbabwe.
Section 4 then introduces other agricultural policy instruments
that are used in Zimbabwe, namely agricultural research,
extension, government expenditures on agriculture and agri-
cultural credit policy.
3.1 Output Pricing Policy
Government control of agricultural prices and marketing and hence
the departure from market determined prices started during the
1930 depression. The state-controlled pricing system of guaran-
teed producer prices and subsidized consumer prices began in
1949. It became more relevant during the period of sanctions
following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in
1965 and has survived through the eighties under the new majority
government. A detailed description of the price formulation
mechanism is presented in Appendix 1.
3.1.1 The Calculation of Nominal Rates of Protection
In order to quantify the price distortions caused by government
actions, Nominal Rates of Protection (NRPs) were calculated for
maize, wheat, groundnuts, soyabeans, red and white sorghum and
beef covering the period from 1966/67 (where data were available)
to 1988/89. The NRP measures the deviation of the producer price
from the border price, the latter being regarded as the oppor-
tunity costs facing domestic farmers. In percentage terms, it is
calculated as follows:- 17 -
(Producer Price - Border Price) * 100
(1) NRP = —
Border Price
A positive NRP indicates price protection, a negative NRP price
discrimination of domestic farmers.
In the calculation of NRPs producer prices were taken at the
depot gate. Farmgate prices were not used because producers are
paid at the depot and it appears to be difficult to account for
the transportation costs between farms and depots. Since domestic
and world market prices should be brought to a single marketing
point in order to be comparable [Westlake (1987], the border
price has to be worked back to the depot gate. For export com-
modities (all except wheat) this is done by subtracting the
freight charges between Harare and the South African or
Mozambiquan ports from the f.o.b. price received at the re-
spective ports. In order to obtain the final export parity price
which can be compared with the producer price, it is also
necessary to subtract the marketing boards' operating costs. One
further correction has to be made in the case of cotton: Since
farmers are paid according to the seed cotton that is produced,
cotton lint realizations must be converted to their seed cotton
equivalents. As approximately 35 percent of seed cotton is cotton
lint, the conversion factor 0.35 is used to obtain the depot
price of cotton lint expressed in seed units. The export parity
price is then the sum of lint and seed revenues. For wheat, the
only imported commodity considered here, the c.i.f. Harare price
is taken as the depot price. Addition of the marketing board's
operating costs provides the import parity price of wheat.
3.1.2 Incentives for Major Agricultural Commodities
As the basic data sources served the marketing boards' Annual
Trading Accounts (i.e. the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) for
cotton, the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) for beef and the Grain
Marketing Board (GMB) for maize, wheat, groundnuts, white and red
sorghum). Additional information was available from the Agricul-- 18 -
tural Marketing Authority's (AMA) Annual Economic Reviews and the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement's (MLA&RR)
Statistics File.
Table 8 provides a survey of the NRPs for the individual commo-
dities. Only groundnuts and soyabeans were taxed on average
throughout the sample period. Seed cotton received a very high
level of protection from 1966 to 1971 and was slightly dis-
protected afterwards. For maize, NRPs were negative in the 1970s
and positive in the 1980s. In the case of wheat (the only import
commodity considered) domestic prices exceeded world market
prices, but to a rather low extent. Beef as well as red and white
sorghum were subject to protection with increasing trends, the
NRPs being on average 100 percent and more since 1980.





















































Source: Own calculations based on data from Appendix 2.- 19 -
This general outline is now extended by a detailed description of
each commodity.
Seed Cotton
Immediately after the UDI the government followed a deliberate
policy of import substitution. Seed cotton was one of the agri-
cultural commodities which were affected. In order to encourage
production, the government set the producer price substantially
above the world market price (see Table 9). In nominal terms,
seed cotton producers were heavily protected with an average NRP
amounting to 120 percent.
From 1971/72 onwards the government took into account the need to
remain competitive on international markets, as about 70 percent
of the cotton lint produced in Zimbabwe was exported. This led to
a reduction in the level of protection to a point where seed
cotton producers were taxed over the years with the exception of
1974/75, 1976/77, 1982/83, 1986/87 and 1987/88. Falling real
producer prices resulted in a decreasing seed production in the
1989/90 season. This forced the government to announce a pre-
planting producer price for the 1990/91 growing season, thus
deviating from its general policy of announcing producer prices
4
after the planting season. Such a price formulation method
facilitates the planning for farmers by reducing price un-
certainty.
Prices to local spinners should be based on export parities
[Jansen (1982)]. Prior to 1972/73, local spinners paid more for
the lint than could be fetched on the international market (i.e.
they were taxed). From 1973/74 to 1983/84, domestic selling
prices of lint reflected more or less its export parity price
equivalents. After this period, the selling price to spinners
remained roughly constant, whereas the export parity price
increased. This state of affairs has been caused by a lack of an
agreed formula, which would satisfy both the CMB and the spinners
and actually means a subsidization of the spinners, who mainly
form large corporations.- 20 -
Table 9: Seed Cotton: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal), Export Parity
























































































































































































Real prices at 1980/31 prices deflated by average of CPI's between lower and
higher income groups. Equivalent of the domestic lint price worked back to
seed cotton price.
Source: Cotton Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews? export parity prices - own calculations based on
data from Appendix 2; real producer prices - own calculations based
on data from Appendix 3.- 21 -
Groundnuts
Before 1980, groundnut production was dominated by communal
farmers. During this period the large-scale commercial farmers
played a minor role, their share in output being less than 10
percent. In the 1980s, commercial farmers' share increased
steadily.
Until 1980 (the independence year), groundnut producers were
taxed by pricing policies with the exception of the 1972/73 mar-
keting year (see Table 10). However, producer prices increased
between 1970 and 1980 by 198 percent in nominal terms and 47
percent in real terms. After 1980, the real producer price de-
clined and groundnut producers continued to be taxed except for
1985/86, 1987/88 and 1988/89. Since groundnuts are a quite im-
portant crop for communal farmers, the pricing policy appears to
be inconsistent with the government's concern of reducing rural
poverty. The lack of protection for groundnuts is reflected in
decreasing production figures, particularly in the first half of
the 1980s. Since 1985/86 the production shows a recovery, which
may be due to more favourable pricing policies.
The selling price of groundnuts contains an element of subsidy
for domestic consumers. Apart from 1985/86, 1987/88 and 1988/89
it has been below the export parity price. The selling price has
also been below the producer price most of the time. As a result,
the groundnut trading account has continued to be in deficit.
Soyabeans
Over 95 percent of the soyabean production comes from large-scale
commercial farmers.
While prior to 1980 soyabeans were exported, the present
government tries to meet the rapidly growing domestic demand for
soyabeans by the local oil extraction industry. In the case of
any surplus, the oil and soyameal rather than the beans are- 22 -
Table 10: Groundnuts: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal), Export Parity



















































































































































































Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement, Statistics File; parity prices and real producer prices
- own calculations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 23 -
exported. If any export of beans has occurred since 1982, it is
made by individuals rather than by government.
The statistics indicate that soyabean producers were taxed by
pricing policies in most years. Producer prices of soyabeans
slightly declined in real terms between 1970/71 and 1988/89.
Despite the adverse pricing policy the soyabean production has
steadily increased (see Table 11).
The comparison of export parities and selling prices reveals that
domestic buyers were more often subsidized than taxed (i.e.
export parities exceeded selling prices). On the other hand,
selling prices were above producer prices in many instances,
particularly since 1983/84. This worked in favour of the GMB
trading account.
Maize
Maize is a very important commodity for the Zimbabwean economy
and thus its price is greatly influenced by political consi-
derations. Both, the large-scale commercial and the small-scale
sector have continued to grow this commodity. The small-scale
sector requires it as human food, whereas the large-scale com-
mercial sector uses a certain minimum as animal feed.
Prior to 1980, maize producers were taxed heavily, whereas the
consumers received subsidies. With the beginning of the first
Mugabe government, the need to guarantee self-sufficiency in
maize grain production (maize is the main staple food crop in
Zimbabwe) was emphasized. Consequently, maize producers have been
protected since 1980 with the exception of the 1984/85 and
1988/89 marketing years (see Table 12). This new attitude towards
maize was also reflected in substantially increased real prices
during the 1980/81 and 1981/82 seasons. At the same time, the
government progressively reduced consumer subsidies.- 24 -
Table 11: Soyabeans: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal), Export Parity Prices,

















































































































































































Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; parity prices and real producer prices - own cal-
culations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 25 -
Table 12: Maize: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal),






















































































































































































Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; parity prices and real producer prices - own cal-
culations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 26 -
In many periods, the selling price of maize grain was above the
export parity price, thus indicating no element of subsidy for
domestic buyers. The consumer subsidy in the 1970s was reflected
in a low price for maize meal rather than in the grain price.
Wheat
The post-UDI period forced the government to implement policies
which would enable the country to achieve self-sufficiency in a
number of commodities, particularly food crops. One objective was
to reduce wheat imports. Indeed, wheat production figures in-
creased steadily over the last two decades except in drought
years (see Table 13). This upward trend in production is not
fully reflected in the NRPs, which do not indicate a systematic
protection of domestic wheat producers, the average rate of pro-
tection being only slightly above zero. The same is true for real
producer prices, which even declined somewhat between 1970/71 and
1988/89. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe became a net exporter of wheat
from 1977/78 to 1980/81. This period coincided with relatively
high protection levels in 1976/77 and 1977/78. Since 1981/82,
Zimbabwe has imported wheat again.
Selling prices to local millers were above import parity prices
in most instances. Millers in turn received subsidies in order to
guarantee low bread prices for consumers [Jansen (1982)].
Red and White Sorghum
The levels of protection for the sorghum producers enormously
increased after independence (see Table 14). This led to very
high stocks of sorghum (particularly red sorghum), which were not
absorbed by the market at prices comparable to the prices paid to
domestic farmers. The GMB had to sell the surplus at large
discounts, thus exacerbating its trading deficit. In an attempt
to reduce the high stocks, the government introduced two producer
prices in the 1987/88 marketing year. Red sorghum had to be
bought by the GMB at a much lower price than before, while the- 27 -
Table 13: Wheat: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal),



















































































































































































For 1977/78 to 1980/81 figures are export parity prices (Zimbabwe exported
wheat in those years).
Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; parity prices and real producer prices - own cal-
culations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 28 -
Table 14: Red and White Sorghum: Producer Prices (Real and Nominal),


































































































































































































years the prices are the same for both commodities. 1987/88 and 1988/89: red
sorghum producer prices and NRPs. In all
for both commodities.
other years the prices are the same
Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; parity prices and real producer prices - own cal-
culations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 29 -
producer price of white sorghum had to be pegged at the same
level as maize grain. For the 1990/91 marketing year a deregu-
lation of the market for red sorghum is planned. The brewers who
normally utilize red sorghum will be encouraged to enter into
contracts with local farmers (both large-scale commercial and
small-scale farmers), while the GMB will only act as a residual
buyer.
Beef
Beef producers were heavily protected during the whole period
under review. Only in the 1986/87 and 1987/88 seasons NRPs were
negative. On average, the level of protection was significantly
higher after independence than before. It is important to note
that during the 1986/87 and 1987/88 marketing years, when NRPs
appeared to be negative, Zimbabwe started exporting beef into the
EEC on a quota basis. The protection rate reported in Table 15
is based on the average realizations of the quota into the heavi-
ly protected EEC market, which is indicated by the extraordinari-
ly high export parity prices in that years. World market trends
in turn indicate that beef producers in Zimbabwe are still
protected. Despite the strong protection of farmers the
production of beef declined in the 1980s, which is mainly a
result of the War of Liberation and four years of drought during
the decade.
Until 1975/76, the local selling price was roughly based on the
export parity price. Afterwards, the selling price significantly
exceeded its border price equivalent.
Altogether, the results of this subsection show that pricing
policies in Zimbabwe do not discriminate against agricultural
commodities. Out of seven products considered only groundnuts and
soyabeans were slightly taxed on average. This contrasts with
earlier findings for developing countries [e.g. Schultz (1978)
and Peterson (1979)]. The fact that only wheat has to be imported
indicates a high degree of self-sufficiency for Zimbabwe, which- 30 -
Table 15: Beef: Producer Prices (Real and
Selling Prices and NRPs, 1966-89

















































































































































































Source: Grain Marketing Board Trading Account (various issues); AMA Annual
Economic Reviews; parity prices and real producer prices - own cal-
culations based on data from Appendices 2 and 3.- 31 -
is partly due to favourable pricing policies. A sharp increase in
protection levels is observable for some commodities (i.e. beef,
maize and sorghum) since independence. Since low consumer prices
are also given priority, this leads to severe budgetary problems.
3.2 The Extent of Effective Protection
While nominal rates of protection (NRP) show the percentage in-
crease of domestic producers' prices, effective rates of pro-
tection (ERP) show the increase of value added [Balassa et al.
(1971), Corden (1966)]. This concept covers protection effects on
the output side as well as taxation and subsidization effects on
the input side of a protective system. Since value added re-
presents production costs of a single step of production it can
be said that the concept of effective protection focusses on the
production costs in a variety of industries involved in the
production of a certain commodity.
The effects of a protective system on social production costs in
terms of profits, wages and depreciation are most important for
questions concerning the allocation of productive factors, the
costs of protection and the efficiency of domestic industries.
High ERPs mean that the promoted industries are able to earn
higher profits or to produce at higher production costs than
other industries. Therefore scarce factors of production are
attracted into these industries and their gross production will
be higher than without protection.
But protection has its price. An ERP of for example 50 percent
expresses that production costs (including profits) are 50 per-
cent higher than they were in the free trade situation. In such a
situation the industry maybe could not exist and the respective
products would be imported, thereby not using raw materials and
primary factors. Under the assumption that the released primary
factors could be allocated to a more productive industry (with a
lower ERP) the economy would be better off because it could take
full advantage of the benefits of international trade.- 32 -
3.2.1 The Calculation of Effective Rates of Protection
The concept of effective protection rests on certain assumptions.
Most important of these are constant physical intermediate input-
coefficients and infinite foreign elasticities of supply and
demand of traded goods (small country assumption). If these
assumptions are fulfilled, value added in the free trade
situation - the latter characterized by the non-existence of any
trade distortive measures - can be calculated by the actual and
free trade prices and the input cost structure of the actual
situation. Empirically, the former assumption seems not to be too
restrictive since a lot of products are quite constant in their
composition of material inputs. Hence, a change in relative
prices is not likely to induce major changes of physical inter-
mediate input coefficients. The latter assumption requires that
world market prices do not vary in case of abolition of the
domestic protective measures. This assumption seems to be no
severe restriction with Zimbabwean agricultural commodities and
manufactures.







where ERP : Effective rate of protection of product 0;
NRP : Nominal rate of protection of product O;
NRP : Nominal rate of protection of Input I;
a_n : Input-output ratio expressed in unassisted terms
Because of a lack of adequate data, the analysis of effective
protection is based on the "Trade Liberalization Study of 1988"
undertaken by Cuthbertson/Wilson (1988) as well as information
obtained from chapter 3.2 on nominal rates of protection of
agricultural commodities.- 33 -
On the issue of price comparisons the Trade Liberalization Study
has recognized that products should be homogeneous or at least
very close substitutes and that prices used in the comparison
should refer to the same point of sale. This principle has been
applied in calculating the nominal rates of protection for the
agricultural commodities. The principle can be applied adequately
if there are reliable data. In Zimbabwe there are many gaps in
information particularly during the pre-independence era. The
Trade Liberalization Study based its prices for import competing
products on domestic manufacturers' ex-factory price and the
c.i.f. price of the import products.
For export competing industries the comparison was made between
the f.o.r. (free on rail) prices of exports and the ex-factory or
farm gate local prices including selling and distribution costs.
However, in calculating the nominal rates of protection for
agricultural commodities we compared f.o.r. prices of agri-
cultural exports and depot gate prices rather than farm gate
prices used in the Trade Liberalization Study. In Zimbabwe the
producer price is at the depot and not farm gate. The fact that
farmers are scattered all over the country side makes a calcu-
lation of farm gate prices difficult or almost impossible.
The study team's major source of price comparisons were responses
from questionnaires distributed to different industries. Addi-
tional sources of information on price comparisons were used when
available.
The estimates of input-output relationships and the production
basis of average nominal rates of assistance are based on 1984
input-output data. Estimates of the levels of assistance were,
however, based on observed prices and current assistance measures
in 1988.- 34 -
3.2.2 Effective Protection Rates for Manufactures and Major Agri-
cultural Commodities
The Trade Liberalization Study revealed that high assistance was
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand,
agriculture - comprising the large-scale commercial sector and
the small-scale sector - was only slightly assisted (Table 16).
According to the study, the ERP was only 5 percent for the
agricultural sector as a whole while the ERP for manufactures
ranged from -21 percent for manufactured food products to 317
percent for basic metals. The study team further established that
food products are heavily discriminated against. They, however,
admit that this is the area where the lack of price comparisons
was most felt. ERPs could only be measured for 3 of the 14
industries in this group.
The ERP for the textile industry is -8 percent which means that
this sector is taxed. One would have expected the local pro-
duction of cotton textiles to be highly assisted due to the fact
that the main input, cotton lint, is sold by the Cotton Marketing
Board to the local spinners at prices below export parity prices.
However, the study states that the negative effective rate
estimated for wearing apparel is a result of a high tax on inputs
derived from the large price disadvantage for textile fabrics.
Thus the spinning industry is assisted at the expense of both
cotton farmers and the weaving and garment industry.
The study established that the most highly assisted industries
are in the sectors of the more elaborately transformed manu-
factured products. The only exception was motor vehicles with an
assistance level of -56 percent. The high ERP for iron and steel
industries (317 percent) is due to the high subsidies paid to
cover losses of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) and
the discrimination of domestic coal production which delivers a
major input into iron and steel products.- 35 -
Table 16: Average Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection for Agriculture








































































Source: Cuthbertson/Wilson (1988).- 36 -
With regard to the manufacturing sector high protective barriers
were created after UDI for import substituting activities with
primary production providing the foreign exchange needed for
imports. This has remained in place even after independence
although more manufactured commodities are now being exported.
This policy which has resulted in foreign currency allocation and
import licensing has maintained a high level of assistance to the
manufacturing sector as supported by the Trade Liberalization
Study.
According to the Trade Liberalization Study effective protection
of agricultural industries is higher than nominal protection.
However, this study neglected fertilizers which are the single
largest input into agriculture. The World Bank's 1987 Industrial
Sector Memorandum [World Bank (1987)] estimated that local fer-
tilizer prices were some 20 percent higher than the import parity
price of substitutes. When the effective rates were recalculated
using a NRP of 20 percent on the input of fertilizer, the average
nominal rates on inputs increased to 5 percent and 15 percent,
respectively, for commercial and communal farming and the ERP for
the two sectors would have been 3 percent and 1 percent, respec-
tively.
Using the World Bank estimates together with the NRPs calculated
above and the input-output-ratios as provided by the 1984 Input-
Output-Table approximative ERPs for the most important agri-
cultural commodities in the commercial and communal sectors have
been calculated. The results of this exercise are given in Tables
17 and 18. The major results can be summarized as follows:
- The level of effective assistance offered to communal farmers
is less than that offered to commercial farmers for both
periods, before and after independence, because they have to
pay higher prices for inputs. The higher the share of fertili-
zers in the price index of inputs, the higher is the NRP for
inputs and hence the lower will be the ERP on agricultural
activities.- 37 -
Table 17: Effective Rates of Protection
tor, 1966-89
a (percentages)



















































Source: Own calculations based on Appendix 3 and World Bank (1987).
Table 18: Effective Rates of Protection for the Communal Agricultural Sector,
1966-89
a (percentages)














































Source: Own calculations based on Appendix 3 and World Bank (1987) .- 38 -
- Where the NRP of outputs is positive and higher (lower) than
the NRP for inputs, effective protection is higher (lower) than
nominal protection. Thus, effective protection for communal
producers of maize and wheat is lower than nominal protection.
- Crops which are nominally disprotected are also effectively
disprotected with negative effective protection being higher
than negative nominal protection. Both, commercial and communal
producers of groundnuts and soyabeans are effectively dis-
criminated against.
Any policies which aim only at assisting the manufacturing
sector, particularly agricultural inputs, implies a reduction in
the level of assistance to the agricultural sector or an icrease
in indirect taxation. From the two studies, it can be concluded
that the agricultural sector is not supported to the same extent
as the manufacturing sector.
4. Other Measures to Support Agriculture
4.1 Government Expenditure on Agriculture
It is important to note that prior to independence government
expenditure was mostly geared towards the needs of the large-
scale commercial farmers (particularly on extension, research and
marketing services). The scenario somewhat changed after inde-
pendence with emphasis now being placed on the needs of the
small-scale farmers. However, in percentage terms the allocation
to agriculture has dropped from the high pre-independence figures
(Table 19) .
Expenditure on agriculture as a proportion of total government
expenditure dropped from 24 percent in 1969/70 to 4.6 percent in
1976/77. The reasons behind this fall in allocation to agricul-
ture included the war, the growing internal refugee problem and
the oil price shocks. While government efforts are now to develop
the once neglected small-scale sector, this is not evidenced by- 39 -
the allocation to agriculture as it has averaged around 6.2 per-
cent during the period 1980/81 to 1988/89. Presently the expanded
education system as well as instability in Mozambique continue to
absorb most of government resources.
Table 19 also shows that most of the allocation to agriculture
continues to be absorbed by subsidies. While subsidies peaked at
71.6 percent in 1978/79, they dropped on average to about 51
percent after independence. Present government effort is to re-
duce these subsidies which mostly go forward financing agri-
cultural market boards deficits.
Expenditure on agricultural research as a proportion of total
government agricultural budget dropped from 20.9 percent in
1976/77 to 4.3 percent in 1988/89. It is important to note that
government research effort is complemented by that of the private
sector which is mostly sponsored by the large-scale commercial
farmers. The drop in expenditure for agricultural extension has
been equally significant; from 24.3 percent in 1966/67 to a low
4.4 percent in 1971/72. Expenditure peaked to 18.8 percent in
1981/82 and by 1988/87 only 8.5 percent of the expenditure on
agriculture was allocated to extension services. Again like
research services, most of the extension effort by government is
presently directed to the small-scale sector while the large-
scale commercial sector benefits mostly from the Commercial
Farmers Union (CFU) as well as private organizations like
fertilizer and chemical companies.
From Table 19 it would appear that agricultural research,
extension and veterinary services have benefitted from a re-
duction in subsidies. The troughs in subsidies expenditure
correspond to peaks on research, extension and vets services. It
is also important to note that expenditure on agriculture is an
underestimate as it does not reflect expenditure by the private
organizations. However, expenditure on these very important
facets of agriculture has dropped in percentage terms.Table 19: Governient Expenditures on Agriculture, 1966/67-1988/89
Tear 1966/67 1967/68 1961/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/71 1971/79 1979/80 1910/11 1981/62 1982/83 1953/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/19
Total Budget
Govemient
In 1000 Ziibtbiean dollari
152110 163895 188382 225313 213884 238361 255802 366201 474383 .546872 608092 738157 882880 984271 1225934 1627535 2121732 2935560 3052689 3389163 3875289 4573810 53902(0
Total Expenditure
Agriculture 11207 17008 24646 54116 24502 41912 33524 42596 45414 32522 27697 39721 65246 67762 63621 66939 99643 153836 221983 225407 319676 313807 418761
2450 2719 3055 3484 3666 4290 5799 6367 6585 7(32 81(2 10131 9888 10801 12005 1(494 15071 16008 18193
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Source: Calculated froi Billing 119851 for 1966-1985 and froi Comment of Ziibibie, Eitiiites of Expenditure for 19(6-1988.- 41 -
4.2 Agricultural Research
The rapid expansion of farm production in Zimbabwe since 1980
would not have happened without the existence of a technological
package adapted to its agroecological conditions. For more than
50 years now, Zimbabwe's agricultural research has aimed at
developing high-yielding varieties (e.g. maize, sorghum). Before
independence, research mainly focussed on individual components
of crop production (i.e. plant breeding, plant nutrition, crop-
ping techniques and plant protection) but with hardly any empha-
sis on Farming Systems Research (FSR). The FSR was established in
1980. With the shift of focus to communal areas, FSR now plays a
major role in the development of the communal areas.
The agricultural research system comprises the Department of
Research and Specialist Services (R & SS), the Veterinary
Services (both in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement), the University of Zimbabwe and privately financed
organizations, i.e.
- the Cotton Research Station;
- the Tobacco Research Board (TRB);
- the Agricultural Research Trust (ART);
- the Zimbabwe Sugar Association Research Station;
- the Rattray Arnold Research Station of the Seed Co-operative
and
- the SADCC/ICRISAT Research Station at Matopos.
Of the above research institutions, R & SS, ART and the Rattray
Arnold Research Station of the Seed Co-operative specialize on
food crops such as maize, wheat, sorghum, soyabeans, groundnuts
and millets.
The private research institutes are organizationally and finan-
cially independent but, in terms of research work undertaken,
they work closely with state-financed institutions.- 42 -
While research before independence concentrated on the needs of
commercial areas (i.e. Natural Regions I to III), the small-scale
sector did benefit from such research (particularly the early-
maturing maize hybrid varieties developed for Natural Region
III). Maize yields doubled between 1950 and 1980. The small-scale
sector also benefitted from the recommendations for fertilizer/
pesticides worked out for the commercial farming areas, in parti-
cular with regard to cotton and maize.
After independence, the government institutions concentrated
their research on the needs of communal areas, while the private-
sector research institutes expanded to maintain support for the
commercial farms. Public research then concentrated on drought-
tolerant crops, such as sorghum, millets and sunflower which can
be grown in more marginal areas (i.e. Natural Regions III, IV and
V) where the majority of the communal-area farmers lives. To
strengthen the research work in the communal areas, the Farming
System Research Unit was established within the Department of
Research and Specialist Services (R & SS).
In the 1988/89 fiscal year, expenditure on agricultural research
was about 4 percent of the total budget which was allocated to
agriculture. On average, agricultural research has been getting a
smaller share of the "cake".
There is need for full support by the public sector of the agri-
cultural research considering that its major focus is now on the
once neglected communal areas.
4.3 Agricultural Extension
One cannot attribute the success of agricultural crop production
particularly in the communal areas to one factor but a number of
factors. It is a combination of factors ranging from increased
credit facilities to improved transport and marketing systems.
The focussing of research on to the needs of communal farmers- 43 -
backed by an efficient extension service (now the responsibility
of Agritex) has contributed to the success of communal farmers.
Before independence the extension services were run on a two-tier
system - with Conex (Department of Conservation and Extension)
providing its services mainly to the commercial sector (large-
scale and small-scale commercial sectors) and Devag (Department
of Agricultural Development) providing its services to the com-
munal farmers.
The two departments were merged in mid-1981 to form Agritex. The
activities of Agritex now center on the communal areas, resettle-
ment areas and small-scale commercial areas. The large-scale
commercial farmers are offered extension service on request. This
is not to say that the large-scale commercial farming areas are
not well catered for. Private companies - for instance fertilizer
companies and chemical companies provide extension services.
Their activities are also complemented by the Commercial Farmer's
Union (CFU).
Agritex, which is staffed with some 2,500 people of which
approximately 1,600 are extension workers, provides extension
services to about 8,000 communal farmers and an ever increasing
number of resettlement farmers (whose figure currently stands at
around 50,000) and provides services to the large-scale com-
mercial farmers on request.
Because the present ratio of extension workers to farmers (1:850)
is low, Zimbabwe's extension strategies are constructed on a
group approach. This approach improves the unacceptable extension
worker/farmer ratio and recognizes the extension role of farmer
leaders.
It can be noticed that the reorientation towards the communal
areas has not been followed up by an increase in staff. There is
need to improve conditions of employment in order to increase the
present extension worker to farmer ratio from 1:850 to an accept-
able figure of 1:600.- 44 -
Between 1977/78 and 1981/82 the budget for extension increased at
an average-annual rate of 1.7 percent in nominal terms. There-
after, there was a decline up to 1984/85 and picked up to 6 per-
cent of expenditure on agriculture and remained constant until
1987/88. During the 1988/89 fiscal year the share of extension
services in the total agricultural budget was 8.5 percent.
There is still a need to increase the budget of extension ser-
vices, with particular emphasis on salaries of staff so that
experienced personnel can be retained and at the same time
attracting new staff of suitable calibre.
4.4 Agricultural Credit
Generally the financing system in Zimbabwe is well developed and
well organized with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe being the
Central Bank. There are five commercial banks (100 branches all
over the country) which offer banking facilities. There are also
other supplementary institutions including building societies,
the Post Office Savings Bank, six finance houses, two discount
houses and one Development Bank. Such a well developed financial
system, however, excludes the small-scale farmer (particularly
the communal farmer) from its lending facilities because their
lending policy is based on viability, proven past performance
and, above all, collateral security as the criteria for credit
eligibility. Even if a small-scale farmer would satisfy the other
conditions, he would still be in difficulty because he could not
provide collateral security. These institutions in practice only
provide credit to the large-scale commercial farmers.
Before independence, communal farmers were only assisted by
voluntary, private, religious and charitable organizations which
could offer only little help in view of the weakness of their
resources in relation to the large number of farmers who needed
assistance. While the large-scale commercial sector was being
served by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and- 45 -
commercial banks, the small-scale commercial sector was being
assisted by the government. Fertilizer companies (i.e. Windmill
and ZFC) helped communal farmers to develop savings clubs through
which they received credit. Such credit was in kind.
Zimbabwe established its first governmental credit institution in
1924. This institution was the Land and Agricultural Bank. It was
replaced by the AFC which was established in 1971 and at the time
was only extending credit to the large-scale commercial sector;
in 1979 it was allowed to extend credit to communal farmers as
well.
In 1978 the total amount of credit extended to farmers in the
communal areas and small-scale commercial areas was a mere Z$ 1.5
million; the largest part went to the small-scale commercial
areas. The large-scale commercial areas at the time received
altogether Z$ 134.5 million (1977) through the AFC.
Farmers in the communal areas and the resettlement areas form a
special category in so far as they have no land titles (i.e. no
collateral); and hence in respect of these groups and the small-
scale commercial areas, the government has taken over the loan
loss risk as well as part of the lending costs. Credits to
small-scale farmers which in 1980/81 were negligible rose to Z$
145 million within four years. Over the same period, the number
of borrowers increased to over 90,000. A large number of communal
farmers still have no access to credit mostly because of a lack
of resources on the part of the AFC and because of problems being
encountered by the AFC in trying to extend credit to numerous
small farmers who lack collateral.
The regional Co-operative Unions (CUs) play an even more impor-
tant role in lending to small farmers. They act as wholesale
dealers and distribute agricultural inputs against vouchers
issued by the AFC. They also buy from their members the products
to be marketed by the marketing boards and retain the sales
revenue to the extent that the producers have to meet amor-- 46 -
tization obligations. The enlargement of the co-operative func-
tions has led to a serious strain on these as yet rather weak
organizations which put their potential for future developments
at risk.
4.5 Marketing Infrastructure
In Zimbabwe, the government is responsible for providing national
marketing infrastructure e.g. storage depots, roads, etc., while
farmers, millers and oil expressors provide their own storage
facilities. The provision of national storage depots is under-
taken by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and Cotton Marketing
Board (CMB), while provision of roads is undertaken by the
Ministry of Transport.
On the other hand, the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) provides
abbattoirs for the slaughter of animals as well as cold stores
for the storage of beef and meat. It is important to note that
existing side by side with the CSC are registered private
abbattoirs.
Prior to independence, most of the marketing infrastructure was
concentrated in the large-scale commercial areas and urban
centres. The situation changed after independence with the
government placing much more emphasis on developing the communal
areas. For instance, there has been noticeable expansion of
depots in the communal areas (Table 20). Coupled with the
expansion of depots has been the establishment of collection
points for grain and oil seeds.
If the government is to realize its aim of having each farmer
within a 60 km reach of a depot, then more of these depots will
need to be constructed in the communal areas.- 47 -
Table 20: GMB Marketing Depots
Year 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total
Depots 32 34 37 41 43 44 45 51 58
Communal
Depots 1 3 6 10 12 13 14 20
Collection
Depots 0 0 0 0 0 0 135 57
To alleviate the plight of communal area farmers, the GMB in 1985
established 135 collection points. The collection points vary
with each season. If the season is bad for instance, then the
number of collection points to be established is reduced. A
collection point is only maintained if it is expected that about
10,000 tonnes of grain will be harvested within the area sur-
rounding the collection point.
The aim of establishing depots and collection points is to reduce
the distance to marketing facilities to 20 km. Farmers bear the
transport costs either to the depots or collection points, while
the GMB meets the remaining transport costs to the urban centres
where most silos are located. For any produce which goes via
collection points, Z$ 1.00 per bag is charged as a contribution
to the GMB costs of transport from the collection point to the
depot.
As the communal farming sector continues to increase its market-
able surplus, the GMB capacity will be stretched to the limit. So
while the GMB continues with its depot expansion, there is a need
to involve co-operatives and farmer groups. However, partici-
pation of co-operatives and farmer groups is likely to be limited
by their ability to obtain funds.- 48 -
The CSC provides farm gate transport for those farmers who book
in advance. Presently, mostly large-scale commercial farmers
utilize this service, as their animals are ready for slaughter
when they are ferried to the CSC abbattoirs. Such farmers are
paid per cold dress mass (CDM).
On the other hand, the small-scale farmers are mostly served with
sale pens whose number has increased very much since inde-
pendence. At these sale pens, the CSC competes with private
buyers through an auction system. The animals are paid on the
hoof. Normally the animals from these sale pens are either passed
through the CSC feedlots or ranches before they are slaughtered
so as to bring them into condition.
Prior to independence only the large-scale commercial sector was
well served with rail and road services. However, after indepen-
dence, the government has embarked on a road development pro-
gramme particularly in the communal areas. A number of major
roads in the communal areas have or are being brought up to
modern standards. This improvement programme has also extended to
the feeder roads. Despite these efforts by government some of the
roads are almost impossible to use during the rainy season to a
point where access to market for the small-scale farmers can be
virtually impossible at some periods.
It can be established from the foregoing that overall government
expenditure on agriculture through public funds is directed
particularly for the small-scale sector. For instance cattle dip
services, extension services and research services are provided
free for the small-scale farmer. Also the credit facilities
through the AFC are provided at subsidized rates. The AFC charges
13.5 percent interest irrespective of whether the loan is short,
medium or long term while commercial banks charge over 17 per-
cent .- 49 -
The large-scale commercial farmers pay for most of their services
through some form of levy except for those services provided by
government. For instance they pay for the cattle dip services,
extension and research services, provided by the farmers'
organization. This is paid through levies charged on revenue from
crop sales as well as livestock sales. It is thus important to
note that the large-scale commercial sector has a greater say and
therefore control over the services it receives than does the
small-scale sector which relies oh bureaucratic systems hampered
by poor salaries, transport and general support.
5. Summary and Conclusions
One of the most powerful factors influencing output is pricing
policy. There is evidence to suggest that farmers in Zimbabwe are
highly responsive to price changes and that the structure of
agricultural output is also determined to a large extent by the
relative prices of crops. The design and implementation of price
policies in the agricultural sector is, therefore, of outmost
importance. The Zimbabwean government intervenes considerably in
the agricultural sector and the most important agricultural
products - maize, wheat, cotton, soyabeans and groundnuts - have
regulated prices.
As shown in this study, government intervention in producer
prices has generally been favourable to agricultural production.
Groundnuts and soybeans are the only crops in Zimbabwe where
producers have been and are currently taxed. This contrasts with
evidence on other Sub-Sahara African countries where producers
are nearly always taxed. However, it also points to perhaps the
most serious shortcoming of present policy. It is that producer
prices are to a considerable extent based on commercial farmers'
cost of production. It is probably not accidential that ground-
nuts - which are not represented by the strong commercial
farmers' lobbying groups - are actually discriminated against.
If, as is desired, production from the communal areas is to
become increasingly important in the years ahead, it is critical- 50 -
that considerations other than commercial farmers' costs of
production enter into the pricing policy equation at an early
stage.
A major issue that emerges in this context is the link between
foreign and domestic prices, irrespective of what the magnitudes
of agricultural taxes and subsidies should be. Many existing
interventions effectively limit the role of world prices in
determining the domestic prices of traded agricultural
commodities, thus making it difficult for the sector to develop
along the lines of its comparative advantage.
It is important, therefore, to evaluate the full complexity of
interventions to gauge their impact on incentives and resource
allocation. The only tenable approach is to try to estimate the
sectorwide consequences of alternative price levels and modes of
implementation (including macro-policy instruments like exchange
rates, monetary policies, credit allocations and tax rates), and
to encourage policymakers to review those consequences before
settling on policy actions.- 51 -
Footnotes
1 It is complementary to Kiel Working Papers Nos. 419 and 441
[Wiebelt (1990a), (1990b)] which investigate the linkages
between industrial trade policies and agriculture.
2 This section is taken from Takavarasha (1990).
3 Major objectives of government intervention in agriculture can
be listed as follows:
- to stabilize farm incomes and prices;
- to achieve food self-sufficiency through increased produc-
tion;
- to maintain and/or encourage an acceptable product mix;
- to maximize export earnings;
- to increase employment opportunities;
- to improve the standard of living in rural areas;
- to keep prices of food and industrial raw materials at rea-
sonable levels;
- to provide raw materials for the agricultural processing
industries.
4 Currently, the announcement of the preplanting producer prices
only applies to winter wheat, whose planting season is six
months later than for the other major crops. Preplanting
prices already existed between 1975 and 1980 [Jansen (1982)].
5 At the beginning, the quota amounted to 8,100 tonnes. It has
increased to 9,100 tonnes under the recently concluded Lome IV
agreement.
6 It should be noted that border prices provide refence points;
they do not automatically argue for free trade (complete
non-intervention). There are often good economic reasons to
depart from foreign prices. In all cases, however, the preferred
means should be explicit taxes or subsidies, levied at the
border. The use of other controls creates implicitly an unstable
fiscal regime. Additionally, an implicit regime is unknown to
policymakers, so that policy discussions can neither focus on the
rationale for border-domestic price disparities nor proceed with
knowledge of what exactly are those disparities.- 52 -
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Appendix 1: The Producer Price Formulation Mechanism
The active representation of all sections of the farming com-
munity is a special feature of the process of determining the
guaranteed agricultural prices in Zimbabwe. The setting of pro-
ducer prices begins with discussions between farmer organizations
and the economic policy committee of the Agricultural Marketing
Authority (AMA). The AMA is a statutory body which oversees all
statutory marketing boards. The farmers present details on the
production costs of the product in question and hence their bids
for the new price level. The AMA representatives evaluate for
each crop the expected board revenue and make their recommen-
dations. The two groups then discuss the crucial issues, after
which the following steps are taken:
a. The three farmer organizations jointly present their price
recommendations to the Ministry of Agriculture. The AMA
Economic Policy Committee also presents its recommendations.
b. The Secretary for Agriculture and subsequently the Minister
hold discussions with the representatives of the three farmer
organizations.
c. The minister and his senior officials discuss the cases
presented and decide on their recommendations.
d. The secretary presents these recommendations to a working
party of permanent secretaries of the Economic Ministry which
is chaired by the Secretary of Finance, Economic Planning and
Development. The working party reports to the Ministerial
Economic Coordinating Committee (MECC) chaired by the Minister
of Finance, Economic Planning and Development.
e. The MECC makes the final recommendations to the cabinett. The
Minister of Agriculture presents his case to the committee and
can present his own position at the cabinett meeting, if he
disagrees with his MECC colleagues.- 55 -
f. The cabinett then makes the final decisions, taking into
account all the economic, social and political implications of
the new set of prices. This also applies to the setting of new
consumer prices, which are recommended by the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce after representations from the AMA.
The producer price formulation mechanism is complex and is
governed by numerous factors including the marketing environment,
the inflation rate, the marketing boards' trading accounts,
levels of parity prices, product substitution effects, costs of
production, etc. However, for a long time, the price formulation
mechanism revolved around the cost of production models which
were formulated in the early sixties. With current government
desire to reduce subsidies to parastals such issues as boards'
trading accounts are now paramount. Moreover, the need to remain
competitive on the world or regional markets leads the government
to consider parity prices much more seriously than in the past,
particularly for export crops such as seed cotton, etc.
Official producer prices are set uniformly throughout the country
and marketing year. Therefore, the present producer price policy
is liable to entail efficiency losses, since it does not take
into account the geographically varying comparative advantages
and seasonally changing supply and demand conditions of the
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a The NRPs are calculated due to the following formla: RHP • (Producer Price - Border Pricel ' 100/Border Price. 'Border price' leans the export parity price (the Iiport parity price in the case of iheatl, which can be derived 00
froi the depot price by substracting (addingl the operating costs of the larketing boards. In the special case of cotton the export parity price is the sui of the seed and lint revenues. Ihe depot price of cotton lint is converted
into seed equivalents through lultiplication by the factor 0.35. I- 59 -
Appendix 3: Nominal Producer Prices of Zimbabwe's Agricultural
(1966/67 to 1989/90) and CPI (1970/71 to 1988/89)
Commodities





































































































































































































































All prices are expressed in Z$, per tonne, except for beef and cotton which
are expressed in Cents per kg. CPI is the average of the lower and higher
income groups.
Source: Nominal producer prices are taken from MLA & RR, Statistics Files, the
CPI is taken from CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics.- 60 -
Appendix 4: Evolution of the Grain Marketing Board
Direct state intervention in marketing and pricing in agriculture
has been in operation in Zimbabwe since the early 1930s.
Prior to 1931 when the Maize Control Act was brought into force,
maize marketing has become "chaotic (GMB Annual Reports). Pro-
ducers, either through their co-operatives or independently
competed with one another and with imports from South Africa for
the limited local market causing domestic prices to fall to un-
economic levels while even lower prices prevailed on overseas
markets in the grip of a world trade depression. Incomes were so
low that a living could hardly be made, producers could not
afford to follow good farming practices, soil exhaustion and
erosion became serious problems and yields fell. Clearly, such an
important sector of the national economy could not be allowed to
collapse and jeopardize the supply of the staple foodstuffs of
the majority of the population.
This resulted in the establishment of a board 58 years ago which
assumed the same basic responsibility as the Grain Marketing
Board (GMB) has today. Actually the statutory control of the
marketing of grain began with the enactment of the Maize Control
Act, 1931. This was amended and consolidated from time to time
and remained in force until 1950 when it was replaced by the
Grain Marketing Act, No. 31 of 1950. This latter Act provided, in
particular, for the control of other products in addition to
maize.
In that year, beans, mhunga (pearl millet), rapoko (finger
millet), sorghum and groundnuts became controlled products. Three
of these products namely bean, rapoko and mhunga, ceased to be
controlled in 1959, 1962 and 1965, respectively.
Following the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland at the end of 1963, the marketing of maize, sorghum,
mhunga and groundnuts in Rhodesia continued under the Federal
Act. It was replaced on 1 May 1966.- 61 -
On that date the Grain Marketing Act, No. 20 of 1966 was brought
into force. An amendment was made to the Act which, on 1 December
1967, constituted the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) as
the Board of the GMB. In addition to responsibilities for grains
and oil seeds, following the dissolution on 30 June 1960 of the
former Cotton Industries Board, the GMB was appointed the agent
of government for the purpose of purchasing seed cotton from
growers, ginning it and disposing of the resultant lint and
cotton seed.
The GMB carried out this function aided by subsidiary legislation
made in terms of the Control of Goods Act, until the Cotton
Marketing and Control Act was brought into operation on the
1 March 1969.
The GMB also acted as the agent of government from 1966 to 30
April 1969, for the purpose of marketing soyabeans. Interest in
this crop grew to the point where, at the request of the Rhodesia
Oil Seeds Producers' Association, it was declared to be a
controlled product under the Grain Marketing Act on 1 May 1969.
Wheat, which had been marketed by the GMB in the 1969-70 year as
a designated product in terms of the Agricultural Marketing
Authority Act, was declared a controlled product in terms of the
Grain Marketing Act on 1 May 1970.
During the latter part of 1971 the Rhodesia Coffee Growers Asso-
ciation made moves to have the marketing of coffee brought under
statutory control and, as an interim measure the Minister of
Agriculture appointed the GMB on 27 January 1972 to act as an
agent for the government for the purchase and sale of the unsold
balance of the local coffee crop of the 1971/72 harvest year.
Coffee was then formally declared to be a controlled product in
terms of the Grain Marketing Act on 1 May 1972.- 62 -
Appendix 5: Function of the Marketing Boards
The Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) boards are controlled
by Acts of Parliament. The functions of each board according to
the relevant Act of Parliament are:
1. Cotton Marketing Board (CMB)
- to do all things necessary and consistent with the provisions
of this Act - to ensure the orderly marketing of seed cotton
grown in Zimbabwe and of lint and cotton seed obtained there-
from;
- to regulate and control the varieties and, where necessary, the
quantities of seed cotton to be grown in any area or areas of
Zimbabwe;
- to buy and sell seed cotton, lint and cotton seed may be de-
livered to it in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
- to provide control or promote the provision of facilities for
the handling and storage of seed cotton, lint and cotton seed
and for the ginning of seed cotton;
- with the approval of the Minister to import seed cotton, lint
and cotton seed as it may deem necessary;
- subject to any general directions by the Minister to export
seed cotton, lint and cotton seed as it may deem necessary;
- to do such other things including the removal of linters from
cotton seed and the marketing of such linters, not inconsistent
with the provision of this Act, as in its opinion are necessary
to assist the orderly development of the production, ginning
and marketing of seed cotton and the marketing of lint and
cotton seed, and- 63 -
- to do such things whether in relation to cotton or not, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as may be required
by the Minister.
2. Dairy Marketing Board (DMB)
- buy at the appropriate prescribed price any butter fat, cream
or milk which is delivered by a registered producer, wholesaler
or butterfat cream or milk, as the case may be, to any depot
appointed by the Board for the purpose, and
- manufacture and prepare milk products, and
- market within and outside Zimbabwe milk and milk products.
3. Cold Storage Commission (CSC)
- purchase at the appropriate prescribed prices all livestock
delivered by any person to the works of the commission, and
- operate abbattoirs and refrigerating works for the purpose of
chilling, freezing and storing beef, mutton, pork, poultry,
fish and other perishable foodstuffs of whatsoever nature, and
- operate canning factories and works for the purpose of manu-
facturing glue, blood meal and other by-products of the car-
casses of livestock and for processing beef, mutton, pork,
poultry, fish and other perishable foodstuffs of whatsoever
nature and for the manufacture of ice.
4. Grain Marketing Board (GMB)
- to do all things necessary and consistent with the provisions
of this Act to ensure the orderly marketing of controlled
products within any prescribed area;- 64 -
- to buy and sell any controlled product which is delivered to or
acquired by it under the provisions of this Act;
- to provide storage, handling and processing facilities for
controlled products;
- to maintain stocks of controlled products as it may consider
necessary;
- to import or export controlled products as it may consider
necessary, and
- to do such other things whether in relation to a controlled
product or not inconsistent with the provision of this ACT, as
may be required by the Minister.
5. Tobacco Marketing Board (TMB)
The Tobacco Marketing Board is a parastatal body responsible for
the control and regulation of tobacco marketing, both within and
outside Zimbabwe, in terms of the Tobacco Marketing and Levy Act,
1977. The marketing of tobacco in Zimbabwe is done through an
Auction System. The board consists of three members representing
the growers, and three members representing the buyers under a
chairman appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. It is financed
in equal proportions by the Tobacco Trade Association and
Zimbabwe Tobacco Association from levies raised on their members
in terms of the aforementioned Act.